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IN MY VIEW
IRAQ: THE MONTHS AFTER
Madame:
Dr. Phebe Marr’s “Iraq ‘the Day After’” (Winter 2003, pp. 12–29) was presum-
ably written before the Bush administration’s much promoted, rationalized, and
precipitously made-inevitable “preemptive” war of Iraqi freedom. Yet at this
writing in late June 2003—some nine weeks into the actual “day after”—it is
clear that the paper had correctly predicted: “Replacing Saddam’s regime . . . may
prove costly, and it may require a long-term American presence,” and that there
will be “the policy dilemma” of working with problematically complex dynam-
ics among three main ethnic and sectarian “communities” and the associated
“inside [and] outside options” for potential leadership replacement.
It is interesting to note that Marr’s paper is premised on the precept of
Saddam Husayn [sic] being “unseated” by whatever “means” it may take, and
moreover on “regime replacement” to be undertaken by the “U.S. administration”—
though “[it] will be one of the most difficult decisions facing the . . . administra-
tion.” Ironically, this precept has turned out—and still is as the debate rages on
“hyped” and/or “failed” intelligence—to be in fact the Bush administration’s
“most difficult decision.”
One would expect studies by those with direct knowledge of Iraq, like Dr.
Marr, to be beneficially exploited in preparing America’s political infrastructure,
armed services mission objectives, and societal psyche and support for going to
war. It would be useful indeed to examine all possible means of effecting the re-
gime change in Iraq. Such an academic—that is, unemotional and rigorous—
exercise might help to understand better the precise natures of issues and diffi-
culties that the United States and the world face in so determined a regime
change; more importantly, it might help in shaping astute strategies and pos-
tures for dealing individually with all nations of the world—well beyond the
Iraqi war, in confrontations with other emerging threats to the civilized world.
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But it seems obvious that no such pragmatic, let alone in-depth, deliberation was
made “before” or on the “day after” by the hard-core handful of war-policy makers
of the administration, the president and Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and
Vice President Cheney—“the Bush people,” as they have been referred to by Sir
Jeremy Richards, Britain’s ambassador to the UN (on PBS’s Charlie Rose, 18 June
2003). The Bush people chose a simpler approach of justifying the war on weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) as the “clear and present danger” to homeland Amer-
ica. More serious is their “conviction” that every “non-Saddam” Iraqi would wel-
come the American “liberators” with open arms. The current daily reports of
serious attacks on U.S. and “coalition” troops by Iraqi militants shouting “Ameri-
cans, go home,” in more than isolated sectors, prove that this conviction was unin-
formed and ill conceived. Is it really fear of the (June 2003) yet-to-be-taken-out
Saddam that is driving this fierce opposition? Do the “Iraqis,” with their multi-
ethnic, multireligious, and multipolitical background—Shi’ah and Sunnis, Kurds
and Arabs—have a common base for classic nationalism against foreign occupy-
ing forces? The often referred to post–World War II unopposed occupation of
Germany and Japan—each a unicultural society—may not be a viable model. Curi-
ously, both theaters in that war had begun in historical-benchmark “preemptive”
attacks that—proving the attacking nation’s miscalculation of the enemy’s will to
resist—resulted in all-out wars and the defeat of the preemptors.
A unilateral, and sure to be judged imprudent, employment of the de facto
superpower should have been weighed carefully against the potential loss—in a
proverbial “quagmire”—of critical credibility and prestige. An extra-astute di-
plomacy is needed in a world that regards U.S. actions and postures from many
varied perspectives, from nationalism-centric resentment to legitimate dis-
agreement. The administration’s doctrine of “preemptive” defense against ter-
rorism—some have called it the “militarization of foreign policy,” others even a
“flawed” policy—has unnecessarily caused strained global and cross-cultural
public sentiments, if not total divisiveness in international relationships.
The military and economic superpower status of the United States presents an
unprecedented opportunity to lead the world toward universal democracy. But that
task will take an ever more intellectually disciplined leadership in Washington.
THOMAS S. MOMIYAMA
U.S. Senior Executive Service (Ret.), associate fellow, and Public Policy Committee
member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, formerly director
of the Aircraft Research and Technology Division, Naval Air Systems Command
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True to the Naval War College’s “rational decision making” teachings, Professors
Dombrowski and Ross (“Transforming the Navy: Punching a Feather Bed?”
Summer 2003, pp. 107–31) assess fairly and candidly the Navy’s progress with
transformation. Their determination to call it as they see it is laudable and
needed, as PowerPoint concepts and plans require as many checks and balances
as the law. One hopes their audience is broad and attentive. Their observations,
challenges, and conclusions, however, are useful to the Army and the Air Force as
well as the Navy.
In the late 1990s, the backbone of Army digitization was the “trans-
formational” Army Battle Command System (ABCS). Field elements would
communicate information of all kinds to a network of ABCS processors, each
tailored to a specific functional area but sufficiently cross-linked via common
message formats and protocols to work in digital and operational harmony with
all the others. Each system had been developed separately within its own func-
tional stovepipe. Bringing the systems together after the fact proved remarkably
difficult, expensive, and frustrating. After five years of tweaks and major digital
surgeries, further ABCS development has been effectively terminated. Bringing
together sensors, processors, and users in a common digital environment, hori-
zontally and vertically, remains no easier today. Our ability to describe what we
want far exceeds our practical ability to implement what we envision. We set the
bar too high, spend a small fortune struggling to reach it, and then spend an-
other small fortune to accomplish individually achievable things that an itera-
tive approach would have had us do anyway.
The list of accomplishments in the transformational arena is manifold, but it
contains nothing revolutionary or remarkable outside the realm of the iterative,
evolutionary application of technology to military problems and systems. We
harness improving technologies and miniaturization as best we can to improve
information transfer and knowledge. It is one thing to set the bar higher, but one
must actually clear the bar as one goes. History says we do that iteratively, one
design at a time, regardless of complexity. Engineers cannot remain perma-
nently in the concept-development and preliminary-design modes if they are to
deliver anything.
Technology applications that make a difference today, and will tomorrow,
tend to be applied to specific problem sets having manageable numbers of vari-
ables. Only then are we able to decide, program, implement, and judge their use-
fulness effectively. In applying the Global Positioning System to “dumb” bombs,
I N M Y V I E W 1 2 7
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for example, we make a clear and present difference. We do not do nearly so well
with higher-order concepts, like network-centric operations and the Global In-
formation Grid. We know what we want in general terms. We are inundated with
visions and proclamations of knowledge-based this and that, horizontal infor-
mation flow, and optimized sensor-shooter combinations in near real time.
Where we consistently go astray is in believing we can have it all now, or within a
few years, without taking the time to design and engineer practical, realizable so-
lutions that must apply today’s technologies with only a limited eye on tomor-
row’s. We aim instead at the elusive “revolution,” rarely allowing time to deal
with the devils in the details—the organization’s ability to employ the proposed
changes, and the tough technical issues of exponentially growing bandwidth,
memory, processing speed. Schedules are too tight and wishful, assuming that
some technological “big bang” will make the concepts real—but as Dombrowski
and Ross remind us, the big bang never occurs.
Compounding the problem of transformation is the breadth and diversity of
customers. Our typical “integrated process team” style forms committees on top
of subcommittees on top of working groups on top of focus groups to ensure
that everyone’s requirements are identified and their interests covered. Transfor-
mation, then, is as much affected by turf as by technology. Perhaps the Navy of
the 1950s had a better way; while many today would reject the autocratic meth-
ods of Admiral Hyman Rickover, one wonders how transformation is to be
achieved without a czar who knows systems engineering.
I agree that though we are not achieving transformations of the magnitude
advertised, we are doing great work, selectively applying modern technologies to
improve what we have and what we are. Certainly our organizational responses
lag, but they will catch up. There is a strong argument for better balance, for ca-
pabilities, organizations, and doctrines that are more complementary than they
now are. There is no magic here; we will be best served if the resources spent on
transformational glitz are applied to commonsense, iterative progress. At the
end of the day, our process will turn out to have been iterative anyway, because
engineering is simply that way. And we will all, somehow, still be relevant.
ALLEN BOYD
Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.)
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NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Madame:
Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack’s article “The United States, North Korea, and the End of
the Agreed Framework” (Summer 2003) was well researched and well written.
The author has obviously studied his material and understands his subject. Yet
the entire article read as little more than a long apology for the actions of the
North Korean government in seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, something
that it had supposedly forsworn in 1985 through the signing of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and more specifically through the adoption of the 1992
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
I will leave it to persons more familiar with the problem than I am to defend
the actions of the Bush administration in reacting to the revelations that North
Korea had begun the enrichment of uranium in light of the 1994 Agreed Frame-
work. My sole purpose is to use that uranium enrichment program as an exam-
ple of the incomplete consideration of an issue leading to a questionable
conclusion of benign intentions on the part of North Korea. Dr. Pollack seeks to
explain away the uranium enrichment program as having “an entirely legitimate
civilian purpose—[enrichment facilities] provide the means for fabricating the
low-enriched uranium . . . to power light-water reactors.” Dr. Pollack then goes
on to analyze in considerable detail whether the uranium enrichment capability
was sufficient to produce one or a number of uranium-fueled weapons and con-
cludes that it was unlikely to do so. Dr. Pollack mentions, but seems to attach no
importance to, the fact that the Pakistani nuclear weapons program tested a
uranium-fueled weapon and that Pakistan may have provided assistance to the
North Korean program.
Despite the considerable doubt cast by Dr. Pollack on the capability of North
Korea’s enrichment program to produce fuel for a weapon, there is no analysis
whatsoever of whether the North Korean uranium enrichment program would
ever produce light-water reactor fuel in meaningful quantities. A more complete
consideration would have contained such an analysis, and I do not know what
conclusions it would have reached. One thing is certain. In light of the incredibly
low prices of enriched uranium on the world market, developing a capacity to
enrich uranium for electricity production makes all the economic sense of a ca-
pacity to produce seawater. The U.S. Department of Energy would probably
agree to give North Korea light water reactor fuel, since it is presently “blending
down” highly enriched uranium from the Russian weapons stockpile to make
such fuel.
I N M Y V I E W 1 2 9
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The article’s overall tone is one of moral equivalence between the United
States and North Korea. For example, in what sense can North Korea be said to
have “reacted” to U.S. intelligence findings about its program? As if the North
Korean leadership didn’t know what it was doing before U.S. officials told them?
A more accurate approach might phrase it as a North Korean reaction to having
been caught doing what it sought to keep secret.
The situation with North Korea reflects a serious dilemma for policy makers,
but one that the article leaves unexplored, in light of its clear endorsement of the
1994 Agreed Framework. The United States seeks to prevent North Korea from
developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. North Korea wants to acquire nuclear
weapons, probably for purposes of blackmail, but possibly for sale to terrorist
groups. Negotiations are undertaken and an agreement reached in which North
Korea appears to have agreed not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and is
compensated for not doing so. North Korea then begins secret activities proba-
bly intended to develop nuclear weapons. What should the appropriate U.S. re-
sponse be? Dr. Pollack’s response, as best I can divine it, is to engage in further
negotiations and (presumably) further compensate North Korea to forgo activi-
ties that the United States believed North Korea had already agreed not to un-
dertake. Yet Dr. Pollack notes that one of North Korea’s objectives is to be treated
as an “equal” of the United States, something it certainly achieved in the context
of his article. Since equality in negotiations is one of North Korea’s objectives, it
has every incentive to breach existing agreements so that it can provoke further
negotiations demonstrating its equality with the United States. It is not terribly
difficult to predict how this process will end. North Korea will have its “feeling”
of equality with the United States, nuclear weapons, and compensation
throughout the process. The only conceivable gain in such an arrangement is de-
lay, and it is not clear whether delay favors the United States or North Korea.
Many commentators on the difference between Anglo-American and Asian
business practices and legal systems remark that the different cultures view con-
tracts in a different light. The Anglo-American view is that they are relatively fi-
nal arrangements, meant to be respected and referred to in governing the
subsequent conduct of the parties. The Asian view is that they are simply way
stations in an ongoing relationship and subject to wide interpretation and rene-
gotiation when the situation changes, even if the change is the desire of one
party not to adhere to the agreement. If that is the case, the entire notion of the
United States reaching agreements meant to be respected with North Korea is
probably fundamentally flawed. Making North Korea a regional issue (which I
believe to be the present policy of the Bush administration) is probably the
better option. It denies the North Koreans their objective of equality with the
United States in negotiations. It places the problem in the hands of regional
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actors (South Korea, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia), who
will be threatened sooner by North Korean nuclear weapons than will the
United States. It will involve negotiations and agreements between cultures that
share a similar attitude toward their obligations. Finally, it will demonstrate to
that portion of the world that cares that the United States does not seek to be the
final arbiter of all international relations. It does raise the specter that North Ko-
rea will develop nuclear weapons and seek to sell them to terrorists, or otherwise
threaten the United States directly. But U.S. intervention at that stage, to protect
itself from terrorist attack or other nuclear threat, however bloody and destruc-
tive, will be as a result of the failure of those states with the most influence over
North Korea and those states most directly impacted by war.
DENNIS B. WILSON
1995 graduate of the Naval War College,
College of Naval Command and Staff,
College of Continuing Education (Washington, D.C.)
PITY THE POOR PLA NAVY
Madame:
Justin Bernier and Stuart Gold’s article “China’s Closing Window” (Summer
2003) has it precisely right. China has been busy trying to develop a military that
can isolate Taiwan and, if necessary, hold the United States at bay. The problem
for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is that as fast as it is able to move
in modernizing its interdiction forces, U.S. military advancements, particularly
by the U.S. Navy, will negate any gains it may hope to achieve.
The PLAN’s one hope for success in a campaign against Taiwan is that it can
successfully blockade the island and limit or even negate a U.S. response by chal-
lenging the American naval presence in the waters to the east of Taiwan. The tar-
get of choice, naturally, is a U.S. aircraft carrier.
Attacking a U.S. aircraft carrier, particularly one steaming in harm’s way, is
one of the most difficult tasks that can confront any hostile power. The
Lexington Institute recently published a study on this subject. In Aircraft Carrier
(In)vulnerability, Dr. Loren Thompson concludes that U.S. aircraft carriers are
I N M Y V I E W 1 3 1
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extremely difficult to find and target, but that even were it possible for an adver-
sary to do so, the defensive firepower available in the carrier battle group and the
inherent resilience of the platform itself would make it highly unlikely that the
aircraft carrier could be attacked successfully.
The substantial defensive capability that the Navy enjoys with its current as-
sets will be further augmented by a number of programs currently under way.
The nearest-term advance in defensive capabilities will come with the deploy-
ment of the advanced E-2C Hawkeye based on the Radar Modernization Pro-
gram (RMP). Providing enhanced airborne command and control as well as an
expanded surveillance umbrella, the Hawkeye will act as an airborne node for
the Cooperative Engagement Capability, supporting complex air defense mis-
sions and leveraging the RMP’s electronically steered, ultra-high-frequency ra-
dar system. The Aegis weapon system currently aboard both Arleigh Burke
(DDG 51) destroyers and Ticonderoga-class (CG 47) cruisers can deal with most
air-breathing threats. In addition, the U.S. Navy and the Missile Defense Agency
are working hard to develop the Area Missile Defense System and the
Theaterwide Missile Defense System to counter ballistic missile threats at vari-
ous ranges. Finally, the extended-range active missile will be deployed on
Aegis-capable ships to address advanced cruise missile and aircraft threats.
On the offensive side, extended air defense will be enabled by the deployment
of the F/A-18 E/F and F-35 JSF. With its enhanced radar, large payload, increased
range, and networked data sharing, the F/A-18 E/F will allow the carrier battle
group to operate at a greater distance from the enemy while delivering a more
powerful punch. The addition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter at the end of the
decade will further enhance the ability of carrier-based aviation to conduct both
offensive and defensive missions.
An observer might pity the poor PLA Navy planners. They have focused their
attention almost solely on the aircraft carrier threat when an equally great danger
to their plans will be lurking below the surface. The United States is converting
four Trident ballistic missile submarines to carry up to 154 cruise missiles each.
These boats will be able to operate independently in otherwise denied waters and
to strike suddenly and with devastating effect. The first SSGN is scheduled to en-
ter the fleet in 2007.
Perhaps most significantly, the U.S. Navy is developing FORCEnet, an infor-
mation architecture that networks sensors, weapons, command and control,
databases, and platforms. Integrating ground, air, space, and sea-based capabili-
ties, FORCEnet will serve as the structure for acquiring, processing, and distrib-
uting a vast amount of information that will improve battle space awareness for
both offensive and defensive operations.
1 3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 17
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/17
The Chinese can buy ships and missiles, but no one is selling network-centric
capabilities. This alone is likely to tip the scales in favor of the U.S. Navy in terms
of overall combat capability in the region. As Bernier and Gold note, China’s
current intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities do not, as yet,
allow the PLAN even to see over the horizon. In the race to dominate the seas,
don’t bet on China. As fast as the PLAN tries to go, as much as it drives itself, the
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